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ARTICLES
BUSINESS AND CORPORATE LAW
William A. Musgrove*
I. INTRODUCTION
This article reviews recent developments in the law affecting
Virginia businesses and corporations. Part II discusses recent
judicial decisions, including: two Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals opinions, one interpreting and upholding the constitution-
ality of the Virginia statutes regulating hostile takeovers,' and
the other determining the owner of partnership property upon
dissolution of the partnership;2 two Supreme Court of Virginia
decisions regarding non-stock corporations, one determining the
validity of the board of directors,3 and one deciding whether
the Property Owners' Association Act supersedes the bylaws of
an incorporated non-stock property owners' association;4 four
Supreme Court of Virginia decisions including one denying a
shareholder's request for a list of shareholders,5 one refusing to
pierce the corporate veil,6 another refusing to dissolve a closely
held corporation held by a husband and a wife going through
divorce,7 and finally, one determining when a limited partner
* Associate, Mezzullo & McCandlish, P.C., Richmond, Virginia. B.A, 1982, Uni-
versity of Virginia; J.D., 1992, T.C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond.
1. See infra notes 10-106 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 107-32 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 149-85 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 186-209 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 133-48 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 210-28 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 229-41 and accompanying text.
1219
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:1219
can be held liable for debts of the partnership.8 Part III dis-
cusses several acts of the 1996 session of the Virginia General
Assembly amending Virginia's corporation, partnership, and
limited liability company statutes.'
II. RECENT JUDICIAL DECISIONS
A. Constitutionality and Interpretation of Virginia Statutes
Regulating Hostile Takeovers
In WLR Foods, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc.,"° the Fourth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals interpreted and upheld the constitutional-
ity of four Virginia statutes: The Control Share Acquisitions Act
(the "Control Share Act");" the Affiliated Transactions Act;'
the "Poison Pill Statute;"3 out of "Business Judgment Stat-
ute."'4 This case arose from the Tyson Foods, Inc.'s ("Tyson")
hostile tender offer for shares of WLR Foods, Inc. ("WLR7). The
board of directors of WLR relied on the above-mentioned stat-
utes to thwart the takeover attempt and defend the actions it
took in doing so. Tyson appealed various rulings of the district
court which upheld the constitutionality of the statutes.'
The Control Share Act provides that when a person acquires
a certain percentage of voting shares, those shares lose all
voting rights unless a majority of disinterested shares votes to
restore voting rights in a shareholder referendum. 6 Shares
entitled to vote in a referendum consist of all voting shares
other than interested shares (which excludes those that are
owned by the acquiring person, an officer, or an employee of
8. See infra notes 242-63 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 264-314 and accompanying text.
10. 65 F.3d 1172 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 921 (1996).
11. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-728.1 to -728.9 (Repl. Vol. 1993 & Cum. Supp. 1996).
12. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-725 to -727.1 (Repl. Vol. 1993 & Cum. Supp. 1996).
13. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-646 (Repl. Vol. 1993 & Cum. Supp. 1996).
14. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690 (Repl. Vol. 1993 & Cure. Supp. 1996).
15. WLR Foods, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 857 F. Supp. 492 (W.D. Va. 1994);
WLR Foods, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 857 F. Supp. 496 (W.D. Va. 1994); WLR Foods,
Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 1277 (W.D. Va. 1994); WLR Foods, Inc. v.
Tyson Foods, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 419 (W.D. Va. 1994).
16. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-728.3 (Repl. Vol. 1993).
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the corporation who is also a director).' The corporation may
set a record date to determine which shares are interested and
which are entitled to vote in the referendum.'8
The Affiliated Transaction Act' prohibits a merger, share
exchange, sale of assets, or dissolution involving a corporation
and a shareholder for a period of three years following the date
on which the shareholder becomes an interested shareholder. 20A shareholder becomes an interested shareholder when the
shareholder obtains a certain percentage of shares of the corpo-
ration.21 The transaction can be approved by the vote of a ma-
jority of the disinterested directors and two-thirds of the voting
shares (excluding those beneficially held by the interested
shareholder).'
The Poison Pill Statute allows a corporation to give share-
holders certain rights or options to purchase shares in the cor-
poration at favorable terms.' The purchase rights take effect
upon a specified event such as the acquisition of a certain per-
centage of the corporation's stock by one person. The directors
of the corporation are required to exercise good faith judgment
when granting such rights.'
The Business Judgment Statute establishes the standard of
care for directors in fulfilling their duties to the corporation and
its shareholders.' A director must discharge his duties as a
director in accordance with his good faith business judgment of
what is in the best interest of the corporation.26 A director
17. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-728.1 (Repl. VoL 1993 & Cum. Supp. 1996).
18. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-660 (RepL Vol. 1993 & Cum. Supp. 1996) (allowing a
corporation to fix a record date for voting groups in order to make a determination of
shareholders for any purpose).
19. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-725 to -726 (RepL Vol. 1993 & Cur. Supp. 1996).
20. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-725.1 (RepL VoL 1993).
21. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-725 (Rep. Vol. 1993 & Cur. Supp. 1996).
22. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-646(A) (Repl. VoL 1993 & Curm. Supp. 1996).
23. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-725.1 (Repl. Vol. 1993 & Cur. Supp. 1996).
24. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-646 (Repl. VoL 1993); see VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690
(RepL VoL 1993 & Cur. Supp. 1996).
25. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690 (Repl. VoL 1993 & Cur. Supp. 1996).
26. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690(A) (Repl VoL 1993 & Cur. Supp. 1996).
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may rely on information presented to him by professionals
unless the director has knowledge that makes reliance unwar-
ranted.27
1. Williams Act Preemption
Tyson argued that the Virginia statutes mentioned above
controvert the purposes of the Williams Act," and are there-
fore preempted by virtue of the Supremacy Clause of the Unit-
ed States Constitution.29 A state law is preempted by federal
statute only if. (1) Congress clearly expresses an intention to do
so; (2) it is impossible to comply with both federal and state
laws; or (3) the state law stands as an obstacle to the purposes
and objectives of Congress.'m Since Congress did not clearly
express the intent to preempt state law in the Williams Act
and Tyson did not argue that it would be impossible to comply
with both the Williams Act and the Virginia statutes, the
Fourth Circuit considered only whether the Virginia statutes
stood as an obstacle to the objectives of Congress.3
The Williams Act amended the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 to regulate hostile takeovers. The Act protects investors by
placing them on an equal footing with the takeover bidder.32
Tyson contended that an additional objective of the Williams
Act was to level the playing field between the bidder and its
target.5 Tyson argued because the Virginia statutes provide
the target management with an advantage in takeovers, the
statutes controvert this purpose of the Williams Act and should
be preempted.' In Edgar v. MITE Corp.,5 the United States
Supreme Court found that the Williams Act preempted Illinois
statutes which favored management over bidders to the
27. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690(B) (Repl. Vol. 1993 & Cum. Supp. 1996).
28. WLR Foods, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 65 F.3d 1172, 1179 (4th Cir. 1995)
(construing 15 U.S.C. § 78 m(d)-(e) and 78n(d)-(f) (1993)).
29. U.S. CoNST. art. VI, cl: 2.
30. WL? Foods, 65 F.3d at 1179.
31. Id. (citing Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 631 (1982)).
32. Id. (citing CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 82 (1987)).
33. Id. (citing Edgar, 457 U.S. at 633-34).
34. Id. (citing Edgar, 457 U.S. at 633-34).
35. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
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shareholders' detriment. 6 The Fourth Circuit held that while
the Williams Act is designed to maintain the neutrality be-
tween bidder and target, neutrality is only incidental to the
broader purpose of protecting investors.37 The Williams Act
does not forbid allowing management an advantage which is
not unfair to investors. 8 The Fourth Circuit found that Tyson
did not show that the Virginia statutes weakened the protection
of investors, for example, by keeping information from the
shareholders.39
Tyson further argued that the Williams Act preempts the
Virginia statutes because the statutes do not provide a bidder
with a "meaningfil opportunity for success" in a hostile take-
over.' Several courts have used the "meaningful opportunity
for success" test in assessing whether the Williams Act pre-
empts state statutes.4' The Fourth Circuit rejected the "mean-
ingful opportunity for success" test, holding that the creation of
an environment that is conducive to takeovers is not the pur-
pose of the Williams Act.' The Fourth Circuit held that the
Virginia hostile takeover statutes do not frustrate the goal of
investor protection, and are therefore not preempted by the
Williams Act.'
2. Burden on Interstate Commerce
Tyson argued that the Virginia statutes violated the Com-
merce Clause by discriminating against and imposing a burden
36. Id. at 639.
37. WLR Foods, 65 F.3d at 1179 (citing IU Int'l Corp. v. NX Acquisition Corp.,
840 F.2d 220, 222 (4th Cir.), adopted en banc, 840 F.2d 229 (4th Cir. 1988) (per
curiam); Hyde Park Partners, L.P. v. Connolly, 839 F.2d 837, 849-50 (1st Cir. 1988)).
38. WLR Foods, 65 F.3d at 1180.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. E.g., BNS, Inc. v. Koppers Co., 683 F. Supp. 458, 469 (D. Del. 1988) (holding
that state statutes do not violate the Williams Act so long as hostile offers which are
beneficial to target shareholders have a meaningful opportunity for success).
42. WLR Foods, 65 F.3d at 1180 (citing Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal
Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496, 504-05 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 955 (1989) ("The
Williams Act does not create a right to profit from the business of making tender
offers."))
43. Id. at 1181.
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on interstate commerce that was excessive in relation to the
benefits of the statutes." The Fourth Circuit found absolutely
no evidence of discrimination, and, assuming the Virginia stat-
utes imposed some burden on interstate commerce, that the
interest of Virginia in regulating its corporations outweighed
the burden.
The Fourth Circuit based its holding on two cases: CTS Corp.
v. Dynamics Corp. of America' and Amanda Acquisitions
Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp." In CTS, the Supreme Court
held that an Indiana statute (similar to the Control Share Act)
did not discriminate against interstate commerce because it had
the same effect on tender offers whether or not the bidder was
a resident of Indiana." Since the Indiana law affected both
residents and non-residents equally, there was no discrimina-
tion. In Amanda, the Seventh Circuit held that an affiliated
transaction statute (more strict than Virginia's) did not violate
the Commerce Clause because it did not regulate or forbid
interstate transactions, and did not make distinctions based on
the domicile of the bidder." The Fourth Circuit found that the
Virginia statutes treated in-state and out-of-state tender offers
exactly the same in that a Virginia bidder confronts the same
difficulties as an out-of-state bidder."
The Fourth Circuit also rejected Tyson's argument that the
Virginia statutes discriminate against interstate commerce by
making it difficult to gain control of a Virginia corporation,
thereby "hoarding" a local resource." Tyson based this argu-
ment on the United States Supreme Court case of C & A
Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown.5' In Clarkstown, the Su-
preme Court found discrimination against interstate commerce
where a town ordinance required non-hazardous solid waste to
be processed at the local processing facility, thus hoarding
44. Id.
45. 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
46. 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 955 (1989).
47. WLR Foods, 65 F.3d at 1181 (citing CTS, 481 U.S. at 87).
48. Id. (citing Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496,
506 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 955 (1989)).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. 511 U.S. 383 (1994).
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waste for the facility.12 In WLR Foods, the Fourth Circuit
found that no commodity was being hoarded by Virginia." Al-
though the Virginia statutes may increase the difficulty or
expense of getting control of a Virginia corporation, they did not
erect a complete ban on the control of such corporations. Thus,
Virginia was not hoarding its corporations and the statutes did
not violate the Commerce Clause.'
Finally, Tyson argued that the burden imposed on interstate
commerce exceeded the local benefits of the regulation.55 The
Fourth Circuit found that, even assuming that the Virginia's
statutes did impose some burden on interstate commerce, Vir-
ginia's interest in regulating its corporations outweighed the
burden.56 The Fourth Circuit explained that Virginia is permit-
ted to determine that hostile takeovers can be detrimental to
Virginia corporations." A state may regulate a corporation be-
cause a corporation is an entity whose very existence and at-
tributes are a product of state law.58 While state regulation of
corporations may affect interstate commerce, a state has an
interest in promoting stable relationships among parties in-
volved in corporations created under its laws and in ensuring
that investors have an effective voice in corporate affairs.59
3. Business Judgment Statute Analysis
Tyson argued that since it sued the WLR directors for an
injunction rather than for damages, and since the board had a
conflict of interest, the Business Judgment Statute did not
apply and should be abandoned in favor of the common law
standard of duty of loyalty.6" Tyson also argued that the Vir-
ginia Business Judgment Statute does not prohibit its inquiry
into the substance of the WLR directors' decision to oppose the
52. Id. at 389.
53. WLR Foods, 65 F.3d at 1181.
54. Id.
55. Id. (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
56. Id. at 1182.
57. Id.
58. Id. (citing CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987)).
59. Id. (citing CTS, 481 U.S. at 91).
60. Id. at 1182.
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tender offer and take defensive measures.6 The district court
denied discovery of the materials used by WLR in deciding how
to respond to the takeover attempt. In rejecting all of Tyson's
arguments, the Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court
that the Business Judgment Statute was the exclusive standard
by which to measure the actions of directors of a Virginia cor-
poration involved in a hostile takeover."
a. Exclusive Standard
The Fourth Circuit found that the Virginia Code expressly
provides that actions of directors with respect to the issuance of
shares, ailiated transactions, and control share acquisitions
are subject to the Business Judgment Statute.' Therefore, the
actions taken by the WLR directors in responding to Tyson's
hostile tender offer are explicitly made subject to the statute,
thereby foreclosing any reliance on the common law duty of
loyalty.64
The Fourth Circuit looked to the Virginia Code to determine
whether a conflict of interest existed on the WLR board.65 The
Virginia Code defines a conflict of interest transaction to be a
transaction with the corporation in which a director has a di-
rect or indirect personal interest.66 A director has an indirect
personal interest if he is a director, officer, trustee of, or has a
material financial interest in, another entity that is party to
the transaction.67 The Fourth Circuit found that Tyson failed
to show that any WLR board member had a conflict of interest,
as defined in the conflict of interest statute.0
Tyson claimed that the Business Judgment Statute only pro-
61. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690 (Repl. Vol. 1993 & Cum. Supp. 1996).
62. WLR Foods, 65 F.3d at 1182.
63. Id. at 1182-83.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1183 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-691 (Repl. Vol. 1993 & Cum. Supp.
1996); Izadpanah v. Boeing Joint Venture, 243 Va. 81, 83, 412 S.E.2d 708, 709
(1992)).
66. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-691 (Repl. Vol. 1993 & Cume. Supp. 1996); WLR Foods,
65 F.3d at 1183.
67. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-691 (Repl. Vol. 1993 & Cum. Supp. 1996).
68. WLR Foods, 65 F.3d at 1183.
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tects directors from personal liability and should not apply
when directors are sued for an injunction.69 Tyson sued the
WLR directors for an injunction, rather than damages, to enjoin
the defensive measures taken in response to its hostile takeover
attempt.70 The Fourth Circuit found it clear from the language
of the statute that the standard is not only a means to assess a
director's personal liability, but also a benchmark against which
a director's actions shall be measured in other contexts.7 1 The
Fourth Circuit noted that Tyson cited no authority to support
its contention that the Business Judgment Statute did not ap-
ply to injunctive actions against directors, and held that the
statute applied to the director actions in this case. 2
b. Discovery Rulings of the District Court
Tyson challenged the district court's refusal to allow discov-
ery of the substance of the information and recommendations
given to the WLR board by its advisor.7'3 The district court
held that under Virginia law the information sought was "not
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evi-
dence." 4 Under Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, information that is not admissible at trial is discoverable
as long as it is relevant to the subject matter involved in the
pending action. 5 The Fourth Circuit agreed with the district
court that the only issue was the good faith business judgment
of the directors, not whether the decision ultimately reached
was the correct one.7'6 The actions of a director are to be
judged by the director's good faith in performing corporate du-
ties, and not by the substantive merit of the director's decisions
themselves.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. (citing Daniel T. Murphy, The New Virginia Stock Corporation Act: A
Primer, 20 U. RICH. L. REV. 67, 107 (1985)).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1183-84.
74. 857 F. Supp. 495 (citing FED. 1K Civ. P. 26(b)(1)).
75. FED. R. Cw. P. 26(b)(1).
76. WLR Foods, 65 F.3d at 1185.
77. Id. at 1184-85.
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The Fourth Circuit rejected Tyson's claim that knowledge of
the substantive content of the information is necessary to deter-
mine whether the director's decision was made in good faith.
Tyson hoped to prove lack of good faith by showing that, based
on the advisor's information, the board should have reached a
different result. The Fourth Circuit found that the Virginia
legislature specifically rejected a subjective standard of director
conduct based on a comparison between a director and the
hypothetical reasonable person.7" When it enacted the Business
Judgment Statute, the General Assembly chose to leave out
that portion of the Model Business Corporation Act which pro-
vided that a director shall discharge his duties with the care
that an ordinarily prudent person in like position would exer-
cise under similar circumstances.79 The Virginia Business
Judgment Statute contains no reference to "ordinarily prudent
person."" The Fourth Circuit held that directors' actions in
Virginia are not to be judged for their reasonableness and a
plaintiff is not allowed to discover the substantive content of
the recommendations made to the board of directors."'
The Fourth Circuit further held that the district court's re-
striction on discovery did not prevent Tyson from being able to
determine whether the actions of the WLR board were in good
faith.82 Tyson had access to various records describing the pro-
cedure of the WLR board, copies of the minutes of board
meetings which made it clear that the directors discussed the
takeover, the name of the advisor, and knew when the WLR
board hired the advisor. The Fourth Circuit held that access to
this information gave Tyson the opportunity to determine
whether the WLR board had acted in good faith, and harmo-
nized its decision with its opinion in Sandberg v. Virginia
Bankshares, Inc." In Sandberg, the directors of a bank re-
tained no independent investment advisor in order to assess a
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1185 (construing VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690 (RepI. Vol. 1993 & Curm.
Supp. 1996)).
80. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690 (Repl. Vol. 1993 & Cum. Supp. 1996).
81. WLR Foods, 65 F.3d at 1185-86; see MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(a)(2)
(1990).
82. Id. at 1186.
83. 891 F.2d 1112 (4th Cir. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 501 U.S. 1083 (1991).
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fair value for its stock, and merely issued a two-sentence state-
ment recommending acceptance of a merger offer." The Fourth
Circuit found that the board in Sand berg merely rubber-
stamped everything management placed before it and held that
the board lacked good faith.'
Tyson argued that had the trial court in Sandberg restricted
the evidence to only the procedure by which the board made
the decision, the jury could not have determined the bad faith
of the directors." However, the Fourth Circuit found that it
would not be impossible for a jury to find that the board in
Sandberg merely rubber-stamped the merger if the jury knew of
the advisors consulted by the board, their qualifications, how
they were selected, the general topics of their advice, and
whether their advice was followed." The Fourth Circuit found
that the same type of information allowed in this case would
have permitted a finding of lack of good faith in Sandberg.'
Tyson argued that the district court clearly erred in finding
that the WLR directors did not breach their duty of good faith
to the shareholders by rejecting Tyson's offer and adopting
defensive measures.89 When Tyson first made the offer, WLR
Director Keeler stated that WLR was not for sale. Tyson con-
tended that WLR rejected the offer before considering the mat-
ter with the help of experts."0 The Fourth Circuit reviewed the
district court's factual findings and determined that while the
WLR directors stated that the company was not for sale, the
directors also repeatedly acknowledged that the board was re-
quired to consider the offer.9' The WLR board had several ex-
tended meetings regarding the takeover, in addition to spending
time and financial resources on gathering information from
informed advisors. The Fourth Circuit refused to reverse the
84. Id. at 1117.
85. Id. (citing Sandberg, 891 F.2d at 1123).
86. 65 F.3d at 1186.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1187.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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finding of the district court that the WLR board had acted in
good faith.9"
4. Control Share Act Analysis
In rejecting Tyson's appeal, the Fourth Circuit interpreted
the Control Share Act.13 Under the Control Share Act, Tyson's
acquisition of a controlling percentage of WLR stock triggered a
loss of voting rights. WLR held a shareholder referendum to
determine whether a majority of disinterested shareholders
would agree to reinstate Tyson's voting rights.
Interested shares may not be counted in the referendum.94
The Control Share Act defines interested shares as shares held
by: (1) the acquiring person; (2) an officer; (3) an employee who
is also a director; or (4) an associate of such persons.95 An "as-
sociate" is a person, business entity, or a trust who controls, is
controlled by, or is under common control with the shareholder,
or who is acting to acquire or control the beneficial use of
shares with such shareholder, or in which the shareholder is a
ten percent owner, fiduciary or trustee.9" An "associate" is also
any relative or spouse of the shareholder, and any relative of
the spouse residing with the shareholder.97
Four directors resigned as employees prior to the record date
for the control share referendum.9" Tyson argued that the four
directors continued to be employees for purposes of the referen-
dum, and therefore their shares should not have been counted
in the vote.99 Tyson further argued that subtracting the votes
of the four directors would not cure the referendum because the
92. Id.
93. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-728.1 to -728.9 (Repl. Vol. 1993 & Cure. Supp.
1996).
94. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-728.3(B) (Repl. Vol. 1993).
95. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-728.1 (Repl. Vol. 1993 & Cum. Supp. 1996).
96. WLR Foods, 65 F.3d at 1187 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-728.1 (Repl. Vol
1993 & Cum. Supp. 1996)).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1188
99. Id.
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directors' vote intimidated the other voters, thereby tainting the
entire vote.' 0
The Fourth Circuit reviewed the facts found by the district
court. The resigning directors did not report to anyone at WLR,
were not responsible for signing checks for the company, did
not have authority to direct other employees, had no office or
secretary, and upon resignation, gave up all salaries.'0 ' Based
on these facts, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's
ruling that none of the four directors were employees of WLR
on the record date. 2 The Fourth Circuit also rejected Tyson's
claim that the entire board should have been precluded from
voting on the ground that they were associates of Keeler-a
director and employee who was not entitled to, and did not,
vote in the referendum.'3 Tyson argued that by procuring the
resignations of the four director-employees, the WLR board
acted with Keeler to control the beneficial use of shares.0 4
The Fourth Circuit held that Tyson's position depended upon
the validity of the resignations of the four directors. Since the
directors' resignations were sincere, the facts did not support
Tyson's claim that the WLR board acted in concert with Keeler
to control the directors' vote. 05 The Fourth Circuit held that
the shares of the four resigning directors and the shares of the
other directors were not interested and therefore were properly
cast in the referendum.'08
B. Transferring Property of a Partnership in Dissolution
*In Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Hish,0 7 the Fourth
Circuit decided the issue of whether a general partner can
alienate his share of the property of a partnership in dissolu-
tion. Koons owned a 22.5% partnership interest in real estate
which was held in the name of Koons Leasing Co., a Virginia
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1188-89.
103. Id. at 1189.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. 76 F.3d 620 (4th Cir. 1996).
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general partnership (the "Partnership")."8  The partners
agreed to dissolve the Partnership and to have the Partnership
distribute the real estate to the partners as tenants in common,
whereupon, after a waiting period, the undivided fee simple
interests would be traded as tax-free exchanges."
The Partnership filed final partnership tax returns and con-
verted its bank accounts into accounts held by the partners as
tenants in common.' The partners filed individual tax re-
turns listing rental income as tenants in common and acquired
business licenses that identified the property owner as a tenant
in common."' The tenants on the Partnership, property were
instructed to make rental payments individually to the partners
as tenants in common." The Partnership, however, never
executed any deeds transferring the real estate to the partners
as tenants in common."' Koons, experiencing financial diffi-
culties, borrowed five million dollars from the other partners.
Koons' loan was secured by his interest in the Partnership, and
the security interest was perfected by the filing of a financing
statement.1
Koons also borrowed 1.8 million dollars from a bank, securing
the loan by a deed of trust on the real estate, rather than by
his partnership interest."' Koons' attorney gave a legal opin-
ion to the bank stating that the dissolution of the Partnership
by operation of law vested Koons with legal and equitable title
to the Partnership real estate as tenant in common."' Follow-
ing Koons' execution of the deed of trust, the partners halted
the dissolution of the Partnership." The partners amended
the final partnership tax return, closed the tenants in common
bank accounts, and reopened the Partnership's bank ac-
108. Id. at 622.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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count." Koons assigned his interest in the Partnership to the
lending partners and filed bankruptcy."
The district court, based upon the overwhelming evidence of
the partners' intent to dissolve the Partnership and treat part-
nership property as a tenancy in common, held that the deed of
trust validly conveyed a fee simple interest in the real estate
belonging to Koons." The partners appealed, arguing that
Koons could not encumber Partnership real estate for his own
use without the consent of the remaining partners."9 The
appellants also argued that the Virginia Uniform Partnership
Act prevented Koons from assigning his individual interest in
the Partnership property.' The FDIC claimed that placing
the Partnership in dissolution distributed the real estate to the
partners as tenants in common; therefore, Koons held an undi-
vided 22.5% fee simple interest in the real estate when he
executed the deed of trust and the deed of trust was valid
against that interest.'
The Fourth Circuit found that in Virginia legal title to prop-
erty can be conveyed only by deed or will.' The Fourth Cir-
cuit noted that a statutory exception to this rule exists where a
partnership is dissolved and some of the partners wish to
continue the business of the Partnership.' Nevertheless, the
circuit court found that this exception did not apply in this case
because a new partnership was never created. 6 The Fourth
Circuit held that because the Partnership executed no deed con-
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 623 (citing Virginia Uniform Partnership Act, VA. CODE ANN. § 50-
25(B)(1) (Repl. Vol. 1994) (providing that a partner has a right with his partners to
possess partnership property for partnership purposes but has no right to possess
such property for any other purposes without the consent of his partners)).
122. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-25(B)(2)(Repl. Vol. 1994) (providing that a partner's right
in specific Partnership property is not assignable except in connection with the as-
signment of the rights of all the partners in the same property); see In re Vannoy,
176 B.R. 758, 770-71 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1994).
123. Hish, 76 F.3d at 623.
124. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-2 (Repl. Vol. 1995) (providing that no interest in land
shall be conveyed unless by deed or will); Southwest Prods. Co. v. U.S., 882 F.2d
113, 117 (4th Cir. 1989).
125. Hish, 76 F.3d at 623; see VA. CODE ANN. § 50-37.1 (Repl. Vol. 1994).
126. Id. at 623 n.2 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 50-37.1 (Repl. Vol. 1994)).
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veying title from the Partnership to the partners as tenants in
commons, Koons did not have a tenancy in common interest in
the real estate."' Therefore, the deed of trust was invalid to
create a lien encumbering the real estate of the Partner-
ship."
5
In rejecting the FDIC's argument that terminating a partner-
ship automatically converts all partnership property into prop-
erty held as tenants in common, the Fourth Circuit distin-
guished between the dissolution of a partnership and the termi-
nation and winding up of its affairs." The Fourth Circuit
held that "[actual termination occurs only after the assets of a
partnership are distributed and accounts between the partners
settled."3° The Fourth Circuit found that since the Partner-
ship was only in dissolution and its existence had not been
terminated, the Partnership still held title to the real es-
tate.3 ' The Fourth Circuit remanded to determine the issue of
whether Koons' execution of the deed of trust could be deemed
an act of the Partnership, or whether the deed of trust created
a lien against his partnership interest. 3'
C. Burden of Proof to Obtain Corporate Records
In Retail Property Investors, Inc. v. Skeens,"' the Supreme
Court of Virginia determined what must be proved to compel
127. Id.
128. Id. at 623. The Fourth Circuit discarded two Supreme Court of Virginia cases,
Klingstein v. Rockingham Nat'l Bank, 165 Va. 275, 182 S.E. 115, 116-17 (1935) and
Woodson v. Gilmer, 205 Va. 487, 137 S.E.2d 891, 892 (1964), which the FDIC relied
upon to claim the Deed of Trust was valid. In those cases, the Supreme Court of
Virginia held that title to property held in the names of individual partners was still
partnership property if such was the intention of the parties at the time of the trans-
action. See Hish, 76 F.3d at 623; VA. CODE ANN. § 50-10 (Repl. Vol. 1994) (providing
that partnership property may be held in the names of the partnership or in the
names of one or more individual partners). The Fourth Circuit found that these cases
had no legal bearing on the issue. Hish, 76 F.3d at 623.
129. Hish, 76 F.3d at 623-24.
130. Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 50-40 (Repl. Vol. 1994); In re Williamsburg
Suites, Ltd., 117 B.R. 216, 217-18 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1990); In re 2111 Assocs.-Chicago,
580 F.2d 705, 708 (4th Cir. 1978)).
131. Id. at 624.
132. Id.
133. 252 Va. 36, 471 S.E.2d 181 (1996).
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the production of corporate records and who has tle burden of
proof. Skeens, a shareholder, requested the names, addresses
and share ownership information of all the shareholders of
Retail Property Investors, Inc. ("RPr'). Skeens indicated that he
intended to contact the other shareholders regarding the mis-
leading manner in which the company sold its shares, the mis-
management of the company by its officers and directors, the
generation and distribution of misleading information in man-
agement reports, and other malfeasance.'
RPI agreed to produce the shareholders list provided that
Skeens executed a certificate to assure that his request was for
a proper purpose." The certificate required Skeens to specify
a proper purpose and to certify that neither he nor his attorney
would use the shareholder list directly or indirectly for any
purpose other than the specified purpose. Additionally, the
certificate required Skeens to certify that "in particular, [he
would] not use the list as a means of soliciting.., business or
other professional relationships or retainers of any nature from
any shareholder." 6
Skeens testified that he sought the shareholder list because
he wanted to file a lawsuit and wished to solicit other share-
holders to join in and help with the expense. Skeens also ad-
mitted that he had never investigated whether his receipt of
the shareholder list would injure the company. A director of
RPI testified that producing the shareholder list would injure
the company, and that the cost and the time required of man-
agement and the board of directors to defend the lawsuit would
be damaging. The director also testified that the directors made
the determination that producing the shareholder list would not
be in the company's best interests.'"
The Supreme Court of Virginia interpreted section 13.1-
771(C) of the Virginia Code, which sets forth four requirements
that a shareholder must fulfill to obtain corporate records.'38
134. Id. at 38, 471 S.E.2d at 181-82.
135. Id., 471 S.E.2d at 182.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 39, 471 S.E.2d at 183.
138. Id. at 40, 471 S.E.2d at 183 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-771(C) (Repl. Vol.
1993)).
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A shareholder may obtain corporate records only if-
(1) He has been a shareholder of record for at least six
months immediately preceding his demand or is a holder of
record of at least five percent of all of the outstanding
shares;
(2) His demand is made in good faith and for a proper
purpose;
(3) He describes with reasonable particularity his purpose
and the records he desires to inspect; and
(4) The records are directly connected with his pur-
pose."9
The Supreme Court of Virginia said that the Virginia statute
evolved from the common law and recalled the rules it laid
down in Bank of Giles County v. Mason,' ° a case decided up-
on common law principles." In Mason, the supreme court
said that a shareholder's right to inspect corporate books or
records is "not absolute and uncontrolled, but must be for a
proper purpose."' The court must be satisfied that the
shareholder's request is made in good faith, for the proper pur-
pose of protecting his rights as an owner of stock, and that
granting the relief will not adversely affect the corporation's
interest.' The supreme court stated in Mason that the stock-
holder must prove that a right of inspection exists.' T
Interpreting the statute through its common law heritage, the
Supreme Court of Virginia held that a shareholder, seeking
corporate records pursuant to section 13.1-771 of the Virginia
Code, has the burden of proving that he is acting in good faith
to protect his rights as a shareholder, and that his receipt of
the corporate records will not adversely affect the corporation's
interests." Skeens sought the shareholder list to solicit the
participation of the other shareholders in a lawsuit. The su-
139. Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-771(C) (Repl. Vol. 1993)).
140. 199 Va. 176, 98 S.E.2d 905 (1957).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 181, 98 S.E.2d at 908.
143. Id. at 181-82, 98 S.E.2d at 908.
144. Id. at 182, 98 S.E.2d at 908.
145. Retail Property Investors, Inc. v. Skeens, 252 Va. 36, 41, 471 S.E.2d 181, 183
(1996).
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preme court held that Skeens failed, as a matter of law, to
carry the burden of proof that he sought the records for proper
purpose.' In addition, the evidence showed that production of
the shareholder list would be injurious to the corporation.'
The supreme court reversed the circuit court's order requiring
the company to produce its shareholder list.'
D. Validity of Successor Directors
In Stewart v. Lady,' the Supreme Court of Virginia deter-
mined who were the lawful directors of a Virginia non-stock,
non-profit corporation which had no members. The Seniors
Coalition ("TSC") was an internal division of the Taxpayers
Education Lobby, a tax-exempt corporation created by Alexan-
der in 1979. TSC published a newsletter and engaged in
fundraising and lobbying activities on behalf of its parent corpo-
ration. In 1990, Alexander "caused TSC to be incorporated as a
separate legal entity."5 One of Alexander's employees, Han-
sen, was the incorporator and sole director. Hansen elected
Stewart and Carlin to TSC's board of directors (the "Initial
Board"). Alexander informed the Initial Board that TSC would
not commence operations and that he would advise them when
they should exercise their duties as directors. 5'
Alexander continued to operate TSC as though it were a
division of the Taxpayers Education Lobby. Rather than follow-
ing established corporate procedures, Alexander ran TSC and
the Taxpayers Education Lobby autocratically; whatever he said
was the law. The chancellor in the trial court specifically found
that the Initial Board never acted. 5 ' Lady, Aldridge, and
McDonnell' convinced Alexander that they should serve as
the directors of TSC. Alexander agreed and purportedly elected
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. 251 Va. 106, 465 S.E.2d 782 (1996).
150. Id. at 109, 465 S.E.2d at 783.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Lady, Aldridge, and McDonnell were members of the board of directors of the
Taxpayers Education Lobby.
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them as directors of TSC (the "Current Board"). In 1992, the
Current Board began to operate the company, squeezed Alexan-
der out, and built TSC into a business with significant assets
and many activities." After the Current Board took control,
it was treated by Alexander and others as the lawful board of
directors of TSC.
The Initial Board knew that the Current Board was operat-
ing TSC and that the Current Board had published a newslet-
ter which the Initial Board had seen. In fact, one of the mem-
bers of the Initial Board had placed an advertisement in the
1992 edition of the newsletter. 5 The Initial Board took no
action until 1994 when it elected Pearson to replace Hansen,
but otherwise did not conduct any annual meetings, nor did it
elect any other directors.'56
The trial court held that the Current Board was the lawful
director of TSC. 57 On appeal, the Initial Board argued that
the Virginia Non-Stock Corporation Act vests sole power to
elect successor directors with the board of directors, and that
Alexander did not have the authority to elect successor direc-
tors.' The Current Board asserted that Alexander, acting as
agent of the Initial Board, had both the express and the im-
plied authority to elect the Current Board.'59
The supreme court found that, according to the Virginia
Code, directors of a non-stock corporation shall be elected or
appointed in a manner provided in the articles of incorpora-
tion.60 The Virginia Code further states that the initial board
of directors shall hold office until the first annual election of di-
rectors.'6 TSC's Initial Board filed articles of incorporation
which specified that the directors shall hold office for a term of
one year and until their respective successors are elected and
154. Stewart, 251 Va. at 109, 465 S.E.2d at 783.
155. Id. at 110, 465 S.E.2d at 784.
156. Id. at 109, 465 S.E.2d at 784.
157. Seniors Coalition v. Lady, 35 Va. Cir. 36 (Fairfax County 1994).
158. Stewart, 251 Va. at 110, 465 S.E.2d at 784; see VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-801 to
-980 (Repl. Vol. 1993 & Cure. Supp. 1996).
159. Stewart, 251 Va. at 109, 465 S.E.2d at 784.
160. Id. at 110, 465 S.E.2d at 784 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-855(D) (Repl. Vol.
1993 & Cum. Supp. 1996)).
161. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-857(B) (Repl. Vol. 1993 & Cure. Supp. 1996).
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qualified.6 2 The articles further provided that successor direc-
tors shall be elected by a majority vote of the directors in office
immediately preceding the expiration of each term.'
Based on section 13.1-855(D) of the Virginia Code and its
interpretation of TSC's articles of incorporation, the supreme
court found that the members of the Initial Board were the
lawful directors of TSC because they never elected any succes-
sors.' " The supreme court disregarded the fact that the Ini-
tial Board did not conduct annual meetings or elect any other
directors until they elected Pearson in 1994. When a corpora-
tion fails to hold its regular annual meeting of the board of
directors, the directors then in office hold over until their suc-
cessors are elected. 65
The supreme court rejected the Current Board's argument
that Alexander, as an agent of the Initial Board, had the au-
thority to elect the Current Board as the directors of TSC.'"
The Non-Stock Corporation Act states that if a corporation has
no members or its members have no right to vote, the directors
shall have sole voting power.' 61 The supreme court interpreted
the statute to mean that the Non-Stock Corporation Act does
not grant an agent of the board of directors the power to elect
a director.'"
The Current Board, citing Coastal Pharmaceutical Co. v.
Goldman,69  Curley v. Dahigren Chrysler-Plymouth, Dodge,
Inc.,1' and Brewer v. First National Bank, argued that
the Initial Board, having acquiesced in the informal conduct of
TSC's affairs, cannot now insist that the informal act of Alexan-
der appointing the Current Board is invalid, and should be
estopped from asserting that they are the lawful directors of
162. Stewart, 251 Va. at 111, 465 S.E.2d at 784.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 111, 465 S.E.2d at 784-85 (citing Blue Ridge Property Owners Ass'n v.
Miller, 216 Va. 611, 613, 221 S.E.2d 163, 165 (1976)).
166. Id. at 111-12, 465 S.E.2d at 784.
167. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-846(C) (Repl. Vol. 1993 & Cun Supp. 1996).
168. Stewart, 251 Va. at 112, 465 S.E.2d at 785.
169. 213 Va. 831, 836-37, 195 S.E.2d 848, 852-53 (1973).
170. 245 Va. 429, 433-34, 429 S.E.2d 221, 224 (1993).
171. 202 Va. 807, 812-13, 120 S.E.2d 273, 278 (1961).
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TSC.'72 In the three cases cited, the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia held that strict adherence to statutory or corporate form
is not required to render the acts of a small, closely held corpo-
ration binding on the corporation.'73 The Current Board ar-
gued that in allowing Alexander to conduct TSC's affairs infor-
mally, the Initial Board chose not to follow the corporate form
and therefore should not be permitted to raise it as a defense
to the election of the Current Board.' 4
The supreme court explained that in the past it has refused
to invalidate the informal acts of corporations to protect inno-
cent third parties who dealt in good faith with the close corpo-
rations. The Current Board cannot be deemed an innocent
third party when they directed and managed the corporation. In
addition, the supreme court stated that waiting to take action
to assert themselves as the rightful directors did not estop the
Initial Board from doing so. 76 Estoppel requires actual fraud
or a representation upon which an innocent third party relied
upon to his detriment.'77 The supreme court found no evidence
of fraud or deception, nor reliance by the Current Board.'78
The fact that the Initial Board waited until TSC was a success-
ful business to assert themselves as the rightful directors does
not constitute a representation, which is a necessary element of
estoppel."'9
The supreme court rejected the Current Board's argument
that under the Virginia Non-Stock Corporation Act, the chancel-
lor has the power to review elections of directors and grant
equitable relief.8 ° The supreme court found that there had
been no contested election which a chancellor would have the
172. Stewart, 251 Va. at 112, 465 S.E.2d at 785.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. (citing Lake Motel, Inc. v. Lowery, 224 Va. 553, 560, 299 S.E.2d 496, 500
(1983)).
176. Id. at 112-13, 465 S.E.2d at 785.
177. Id. (citations omitted).
178. Id. at 113, 465 S.E.2d at 785-86.
179. Id., 465 S.E.2d at 786.
180. Id. at 113-14, 465 S.E.2d at 786; see VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-861 (Reph Vol
1993 & Cum. Supp. 1996).
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power to review. 1 Alexander did not have the statutory au-
thority to elect successors to the Initial Board. 1 2 Nor did the
supreme court agree with the Current Board's argument that
the doctrine of laches barred the Initial Board from asserting
its validity. The supreme court found that the Current Board
knew in 1992 that the Initial Board was the lawful board and
had not elected any successor directors.'" Therefore, the Ini-
tial Board's failure to assert its claims earlier did not prejudice
the Current Board.'" The supreme court reversed the judg-
ment of the trial court and declared that the members of the
Initial Board were the lawful directors of TSC.'"
E. Statutory Restriction on Management by Board of Directors
In Lake Monticello Owners' Ass'n v. Lake, ' the Supreme
Court of Virginia ruled on the interaction between the Virginia
Non-Stock Corporation Act' and the Property Owners' Asso-
ciation Act.' Lake Monticello Owners' Association is a non-
stock corporation that is subject to the provisions of the Prop-
erty Owners' Association Act.'89 The bylaws of the association
give members the right to include proposals appropriate for
membership action in the proxy statement and notice of the
next annual meeting.9 The bylaws also provide that a pro-
posal can be disqualified if it is not a proper subject for action
by members or if it deals with a matter relating to the ordinary
business operations of the association.'9' The Property
Owners' Association Act gives the board of directors the power
to establish, adopt, and enforce rules and regulations, but also
grants the members the right to repeal or amend any rule or
181. Stewart, 251 Va. at 114, 465 S.E.2d at 786.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 114-15, 465 S.E.2d at 786-87.
185. Id. at 115, 465 S.E.2d at 787.
186. 250 Va. 565, 463 S.E.2d 652 (1995).
187. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-801 to -980 (Repl. Vol. 1993 & Cum. Supp. 1996).
188. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-508 to -516.2 (Repl. VoL 1995 & Cum. Supp. 1996).
189. Lake, 250 Va. at 567, 463 S.E.2d at 653.
190. Id. at 569, 463 S.E.2d at 654.
191. Id., 463 S.E.2d at 654-55.
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regulation adopted by the board of directors with respect to the
use of the common areas.
19 2
Certain members of the association filed a proposal to amend
several of the association's bylaws, rules, regulations, and poli-
cies with respect to the use of common areas. The members
proposed amending bylaws requiring invitees to obtain a guest
card, charging annual greens fees to property owners who do
not play golf, appointing the security guards as special police-
men, and restricting access by prospective purchasers." The
board of directors of the association refused to include the pro-
posal in the proxy on the ground that the proposal was not a
proper subject for action by members and dealt with matters
relating to the ordinary business operations of the associa-
tion.' The trial court invalidated the bylaws which limited
the members' right to repeal director actions on the ground that
the bylaws violated the Property Owners' Association Act.
The supreme court reversed the trial court's invalidation of
the bylaws, citing a settled rule of statutory construction: If
apparently conflicting statutes can be harmonized and effect
given to both, they will be so construed.9 ' The supreme court
held that this rule was equally applicable where there is a
conflict between a statute and a corporate bylaw. 9' The su-
preme court interpreted the bylaws of the association to limit
the board's disqualification right to those proposals which relate
to matters within the exclusive control of the board. 9 '
The supreme court next turned to the issue of whether the
member proposals were properly disqualified by the board. The
board of directors contended that since the members failed to
introduce any evidence showing that the board of directors
192. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-513(A) (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cum. Supp. 1996). There is no
similar statutory right given to shareholders under the Virginia Stock Corporation Act
or to members under the Virginia Non-Stock Corporation Act. Lake, 250 Va. at 568-
69, 463 S.E.2d at 654.
193. Lake, 250 Va. at 569, 463 S.E.2d at 655.
194. Id. at 570, 463 S.E.2d at 655.
195. Id.
196. Id. (citing Albemarle County v. Marshall, 215 Va. 756, 761, 214 S.E.2d 146,
150 (1975)).
197. Id.
198. Id. (citing Marshall, 215 Va. at 761, 214 S.E.2d at 150).
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acted in bad faith, the court need not inquire into the correct-
ness of the board's decision, arguing that the board's decision is
subject to a presumption of correctness under the Virginia Busi-
ness Judgment Statute." In rejecting the board's Business
Judgment Statute defense, the supreme court held that the
Business Judgment Statute only applies to a decision that is a
business judgment and does not apply to a decision, such as the
one in this case, which construes and applies a statute and a
corporate bylaw."0
The supreme court next considered the correctness of the
board's decision to disqualify the proposal. The board argued
that a member can only amend bylaws with respect to matters
such as the conduct of meetings, the elections of directors and
officers, the duties of officers and committees and other matters
of internal concern. The members of a property owners' associa-
tion do not have the right to propose changes relating to the
day-to-day activities of the association or the making of corpo-
rate policy and management decisions.2"'
Comparing this issue with the right of stockholders to amend
the bylaws of an ordinary corporation, the supreme court stated
that the Property Owners' Association Act gives members of the
association specific statutory rights to amend or repeal the
board's rules with respect to the use of the common areas.0 2
The supreme court found that the rules and regulations which
members sought to amend either restricted the future conduct
of the members in the exercise of their rights in the
communitity, or subjected them to the penalties for failure to
follow the rules enforced by the association's employees and
agents. 3 Since the proposal dealt with the members' use of
the common area, the supreme court held that the Property
199. Id. at 571, 463 S.E.2d at 656; see VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-870 (Repl. Vol. 1993
& Cum. Supp. 1996).
200. Id. (citing Gottlieb v. Economy Stores, 199 Va. 848, 857, 102 S.E.2d 345, 352
(1958) (holding that action of corporation must be in accordance with law and corpo-
rate powers)).
201. Id. at 572, 463 S.E.2d at 656.
202. Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 55-513(A) (Repl. Vol. 1995)).
203. Id.
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Owners' Association Act authorized the members to make the
proposal.2
The supreme court further found that the board's "statements
of policy," which bound the future conduct of the members and
provided penalties for their violations, were actually rules and
regulations which the Property Owners' Association Act autho-
rizes the members to repeal." 5 The supreme court distin-
guished Lake from Kaplan v. Block,"6 which the board cited
for the proposition that the proposal cannot divest the board of
its duty of management and control by creating a sterilized
board of directors. °7 The supreme court stated that Kaplan
involved a stock corporation, not a non-stock corporation subject
to the Property Owners' Association Act."' In addition, the
proposal did not create a sterilized board in which every action
of the board had to be approved by members.2"
F. Piercing the Corporate Veil
In Bogese, Inc. v. State Highway and Transportation Commis-
sion,210 the Supreme Court of Virginia refused Bogese, Inc.'s,
("Bogese") request to pierce its own corporate veil to find unity
of ownership between real estate owned by the corporation and
an adjacent condemned parcel.2 ' Bogese, the shareholders of
which were the Bogese family, owned a parcel of real estate, a
portion of which was to be acquired by eminent domain."2
Bogese transferred the remaining land to a family-owned part-
nership to begin development.213 When the Commonwealth ac-
quired the condemned parcel from Bogese, the partnership
claimed the taking damaged its adjacent parcel of land.214
204. Id., 463 S.E.2d at 656-57.
205. Id. at 573, 463 S.E.2d at 657 (citing Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Unit-
ed States, 316 U.S. 407, 422 (1942)).
206. 183 Va. 327, 332, 31 S.E.2d 893, 895 (1944).
207. Lake, 250 Va. at 573, 463 S.E.2d at 657.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 572, 463 S.E.2d at 656.
210. 250 Va. 226, 462 S.E.2d 345 (1995).
211. Id. at 227-28, 462 S.E.2d at 346.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 228, 462 S.E.2d at 346.
214. Id.
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Generally, when a portion of a tract of land is taken by
eminent domain, the owner is entitled to recover damage for
the remainder of the tract, but not for damage to separate and
independent tracts. 5 The exception to the rule is the unity of
lands doctrine, a requirement of which is the unity of owner-
ship of the condemned parcel and the separate tract.216 The
Commonwealth disputed the existence of unity of ownership
because at the time of the taking Bogese owned the condemned
tract and the partnership owned the adjacent tract. 7 Bogese
and the partnership contended that the substantially identical
ownership of the two parcels satisfied the unity of lands
doctrine."8
To determine this issue of first impression, the supreme court
looked to decisions in other jurisdictions.' The supreme court
was unwilling to adopt the position held by courts in New Jer-
sey and New York, cited by the partnership." These courts
held that two parcels, each owned by a different entity, may be
considered a single parcel to establish unity of ownership when
the entities are integrated by family ownership, business pur-
pose, and actual practice." Instead, the Supreme Court of
Virginia found more persuasive the opinions of courts in Penn-
sylvania and North Carolina which preserved the corporate
form.
In Sams v. Redevelopment Authority,' a partnership owned
the condemned parcel and a corporation owned a nearby
tract.' In Sams, the shareholders of the corporation, who
were also the partners in the partnership, sought damages to
the corporation's tract. The shareholders argued that the tracts
were owned by the'same owners and were used together for the
215. Id. at 228-29, 462 S.E.2d at 346-47.
216. Id. at 229, 462 S.E.2d at 346 (citing Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Webb, 196
Va. 555, 566, 84 S.E.2d 735, 741-42 (1954)).
217. Id., 462 S.E.2d at 347.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. See Housing Auth. of Newark v. Norfolk Realty Co., 364 A.2d 1052 (1976);
M.T.M. Realty Corp. v. State, 261 N.Y.S.2d 815 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1965).
221. Bogese, 250 Va. at 229, 462 S.E.2d at 347.
222. 244 A.2d 779 (Pa. 1968).
223. Id. at 780.
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same integrated purpose.2' The Supreme Court of Pennsylva-
nia stated that the corporate entity will be disregarded only
when the entity is used to defeat public convenience, justify
wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime." In Board of Trans-
portation v. Martin,226 the Supreme Court of North Carolina
ruled that a parcel of land owned by an individual and an
adjacent parcel owned by a corporation, of which the individual
is sole shareholder, cannot be treated as a unified tract.227
The Supreme Court of Virginia found that the rationale ex-
pressed by these authorities followed previous statements of the
supreme court in which it held that only an extraordinary ex-
ception will justify piercing the corporate veil, as when it is
used as a device to mask wrongs, obscure fraud, or hide
crime.'
G. Dissolution of Close Corporation
In Schultz v. Schultz,29 the Supreme Court of Virginia held
that a fifL percent shareholder in a close corporation was a
necessary party in a dissolution suit brought against the corpo-
ration by the other fifty percent shareholder.2'0 Gerald and
Marilyn Schultz, husband and wife, as well as the sole share-
holders, directors and officers of a Virginia professional corpora-
tion, were involved in a divorce proceeding."3 The divorce
court prohibited the Schultzes from transferring any assets of
the marital estate and determined that the fair-market value of
the corporation was $500,000.232 After the divorce court pro-
hibited the transfer of marital assets, Gerald filed a dissolution
suit against the corporation under section 13.1-747 of the Vir-
224. Bogese, 250 Va. at 229, 462 S.E.2d at 347.
225. Sams, 244 A.2d at 781 (holding that one cannot choose to accept the benefits
incident to a corporate enterprise and at the same time brush aside the corporate
form when it works to the shareholder's detriment).
226. 249 S.E.2d 390 (N.C. 1978).
227. Id. at 396.
228. Bogese, 250 Va. at 230-31, 462 S.E.2d at 348 (citations omitted).
229. 250 Va. 121, 458 S.E.2d 458 (1995).
230. Id. at 124, 458 S.E.2d at 460.
231. Id. at 122, 458 S.E.2d at 459.
232. Id.
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ginia Code and requested the appointment of a receiver.'
Marilyn was not named as a party in the suit.
The dissolution court, holding that the corporation's board of
directors was deadlocked, dissolved the corporation and appoint-
ed a receiver.' The order of dissolution directed Marilyn to
cooperate with the receiver, execute certain documents and
agreements, and produce all documents requested by the receiv-
er in connection with a plan of reorganization approved by the
dissolution court.' In addition, the plan of reorganization
provided for the formation of a new corporation in which Mari-
lyn would be the sole shareholder and required the new corpo-
ration to indemnify the dissolved corporation.- 6
The supreme court found that the Virginia Code authorizes a
circuit court to dissolve a corporation under certain circum-
stances, including a deadlock in the board of directors."7 The
dissolution statute also states that it is not necessary to make
directors or shareholders parties to the proceeding unless relief
is sought against them individually." 8 The supreme court
found that the dissolution court order sought relief from Mari-
lyn individually in numerous respects, and therefore Marilyn
was a necessary party to the dissolution suit. 9 Since a court
cannot render a valid judgment when necessary parties to a
proceeding are not before the court, the supreme court vacated
the dissolution order.' Because the divorce court enjoined the
litigants from transferring any assets of the marital estate, the
supreme court stayed all proceedings in the dissolution suit
until the divorce proceeding was final." 1
233. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-747 (Repl. Vol. 1993 & Cum. Supp. 1996).
234. Schultz, 250 Va. at 124, 458 S.E.2d at 460.
235. Id., 458 S.E.2d at 459.
236. Id., 458 S.E.2d at 460.
237. Id., 458 S.E.2d at 459; see VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-747(A)(1)(a) (Repl. Vol. 1993
& Cum. Supp. 1996).
238. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-747(D) (Repl. Vol. 1993 & Cum. Supp. 1996).
239. Schultz, 250 Va. at 124, 458 S.E.2d at 460.
240. Id. (citing Allen v. Chapman, 242 Va. 94, 99, 406 S.E.2d 186, 188 (1991)).
241. Id. at 125, 458 S.E.2d at 460.
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H. Liability of a Limited Partner for Debts of Partnership
In Sloan v. Thorton,' the Supreme Court of Virginia deter-
mined whether a limited partner had become a general partner,
was in control of the partnership, or should otherwise be held
liable for partnership debts based on his ownership of shares in
the corporate general partner. Sloan obtained a judgment
against the partnership and sought to collect from Thorton, a
limited partner owning a twenty-five percent interest in the
partnership.' The two general partners of the partnership
were Rawn, an individual, and a corporation whose stock was
initially owned equally by Rawn and Thorton.' The trial
court found that Thorton signed a guarantee with the title com-
pany indicating he was a general partner of the partnership,
and that Rawn had assigned his stock in the corporate general
partner and his general partnership interest in the partnership
to Thorton. Sloan argued that these facts established that
Thorton was a general partner liable for the partnership
debts."
The supreme court looked to the Virginia Revised Uniform
Limited Partnership Act to determine whether Thorton had
become a general partner of the limited partnership. 7 The
supreme court found that the Limited Partnership Act provided
that the partnership agreement governed the admission of gen-
eral partners to a partnership." The Act further provided
that when there is a change in general partners, an amended
certificate of limited partnership reflecting the addition or with-
drawal of a general partner must be filed with the State Corpo-
ration Commission." The partnership agreement provided
242. 249 Va. 492, 457 S.E.2d 60 (1995).
243. Id. at 495, 457 S.E.2d at 61.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 496, 457 S.E.2d at 62.
246. Id.
247. Id. (construing VA. CODE ANN. §§ 50-73.1 to -73.78. (Repl. Vol. 1994 & Cur.
Supp. 1995)); see VA. CODE ANN. §§ 50-73.1 to -73.78 (Repl. Vol. 1996).
248. Sloan, 249 Va. at 496, 457 S.E.2d at 62 (construing VA. CODE ANN. § 50-
73.27 (Repl. Vol. 1994 & Cum. Supp. 1995)); see VA. CODE ANN. § 50-73.27 (Repl.
Vol. 1996).
249. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-73.12 (Repl. VoL 1994 & Cum. Supp. 1995); see VA.
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that a person could become a general partner only if all general
partners and fifty-one percent in interest of all limited partners
consented and the partnership's counsel issued an opinion stat-
ing that the new general partner was admitted in conformity
with federal and state law. °
The supreme court found no evidence in the record that
either the general partners or fifty-one percent of the limited
partners consented to admitting Thorton as a general partner of
the partnership, that no legal opinion had been issued, or that
an amended certificate of partnership was filed with the State
Corporation Commission. 1 The supreme court held that a
finding that one is a general partner must be based on
proof-absent in this case-of the necessary statutory
elements. 2
Sloan argued for imposing personal liability on Thorton on
the ground that Thorton was a limited partner in control of the
partnershipY3 The supreme court held that the Limited Part-
nership Act provides that a limited partner in control is liable
only to those persons who transact business with the limited
partner reasonably believing that the limited partner is a gen-
eral partner.' The supreme court reviewed the facts found by
the trial court and concluded that Sloan personally had never
met Thorton, that Sloan dealt directly with Rawn in matters
regarding the partnership, that Thorton was not involved in
any of Sloan's negotiations with the partnership, and that
Thorton was not a limited partner during the time in which the
partnership incurred debts to Sloan. 5 Based on these facts,
the supreme court found that there was no credible evidence to
support a finding that Thorton was a limited partner in control
of the partnership or that Sloan relied in any way on Thorton's
actions in contracting with the limited partnership. 6
CODE ANN. § 50-73.12 (Repl. Vol. 1996).
250. Sloan, 249 Va. at 497, 457 S.E.2d at 62.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id., 457 S.E.2d at 62-63.
254. Id., 457 S.E.2d at 62 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 50-73.24(A) (RepI. Vol. 1994 &
Cum. Supp. 1995)); see VA. CODE ANN. § 50-73.2(A) (Repl. Vol. 1996).
255. Id. at 498, 457 S.E.2d at 63.
256. Id.
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Finally, the supreme court refused to pierce the corporate veil
of the corporate general partner to hold Thorton liable for part-
nership debts based on his stock ownership of the corporate
general partner.257 Sloan argued that the corporate form
should be ignored because no directors' meetings were held and
Thorton did not know the telephone number, location or assets
of the corporation, did not know that he was a director, and did
not receive a salary as a director.Y The supreme court found
that while the corporate general partner ignored formalities,
piercing the corporate veil to impose liability on a shareholder
is an extraordinary remedy which should be undertaken only
when necessary to avoid an injustice. 9
The supreme court held that three conditions must exist to
hold a shareholder personally liable for debts of a corpora-
tion.2 0 First, the corporation must be a sham corporation, an
indication of which is the disregard of corporate formalities.26 '
Second, the corporation must be the alter ego, alias, stooge, or
dummy corporation of the shareholder, and third, the corpora-
tion must be used by the shareholder to disguise a wrong or to
obscure a fraud by the shareholder.262 The supreme court
found that there was no evidence that the corporation was
Thorton's alter ego or that he used the corporate form to hide
fraud, and refused to pierce the corporate veil of the corporate
general partner.2
III. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
Recent legislation passed by the General Assembly and
signed by the Governor includes a restriction on the right of
shareholders to vote by class on amendments to the articles of
257. Id. at 499, 457 S.E.2d at 63-64.
258. Id. at 498, 457 S.E.2d at 63.
259. Id. (citing O'Hazza v. Executive Credit Corp., 246 Va. 111, 115, 431 S.E.2d
318, 320 (1993)).
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 499 n.3, 457 S.E.2d at 63 n.3 (citing Perpetual Real Estate Servs., Inc.
v. Michaelson Properties, 974 F.2d 545 (4th Cir. 1992)).
263. Id. at 498-99, 457 S.E.2d at 63.
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incorporation of a corporation,2" and a limitation on the right
to dissent to a major corporate transaction.2 5 Another bill
made numerous changes to the Virginia Liability Company Act
and the Revised Partnership Act.266 The General Assembly al-
so repealed the Virginia Code statutes governing general part-
nerships effective January 1, 2001, and adopted the Uniform
Partnership Act of 1994, effective June 1, 1997.67
A. Voting on Amendments by Classes of Shares
The General Assembly amended and reenacted section 13.1-
708 which governs voting on amendments to articles of incorpo-
ration by voting groups.2 1 Section 13.1-708 provides that out-
standing shares of a class are entitled to vote as a separate
voting group if the proposed amendment would increase or
decrease the aggregate number of authorized shares of that
class. 9 The statute prohibits the dilution or elimination of
the voting power of the class. The amended statute provides
such a vote of the class is not required if so provided in the
articles of incorporation in effect prior to the issuance of any
shares of that class.27 0 Nor is a class vote required if so pro-
vided in any prior amendment to the articles of incorporation
which was approved by the required vote of the shares of such
class.2 1 However, the statute also provides that the amend-
ment may not decrease the number of authorized shares of the
class below the number of shares then outstanding or required
to be reserved for issuance.72 In that case, the affirmative
vote of the class as a separate voting group would still be re-
quired.273 The statute further provides that if a proposed
amendment entitling two or more classes to vote as separate
voting groups would affect those two classes the same or in a
264. See infra notes 268-75 and accompanying text.
265. See infra notes 276-78 and accompanying text.
266. See infra notes 294-308 and accompanying text.
267. See infra notes 309-14 and accompanying text.
268. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-708 (Cum. Supp. 1996).
269. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-708(AX1) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
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substantially similar way, the shares of those classes shall vote
together as a single voting group on the proposed amend-
ment. 4 Prior to the amendment of the statute, this provision
only applied to series within a class of shares. 75
B. Limitation on Shareholders' Dissent
A shareholder is generally allowed a right to dissent and to
obtain payment of the fair-market value of his shares from the
corporation in the event of merger, share exchange, or sale of
all the property of the corporation. 78 However, a shareholder
has no right to dissent from a major transaction if the
corporation's shares held by the shareholder are listed on a
national securities exchange, provided the transaction meets
certain conditions. 7 The amended statute additionally limits
the dissent of a shareholder whose shares are listed on the
National Association of Securities Automated Quotation System
("NASDAQ). 278
C. Filing of Name-Change Certificates
The General Assembly amended and reenacted sections 13.1-
633, 13.1-832, 13.1-1067 and 50-37.3 of the Virginia Code relat-
ing to stock and non-stock corporations, partnerships, and limit-
ed liability companies to provide for circuit court clerk filing
and recordation of name-change certificates issued by the State
Corporation Commission. 279  Such name-change certificates
may be admitted to record in the deed books of the recording
office within the jurisdiction where any property of the business
entity is located in order to maintain the continuity of title re-
cords.28 0 The certificate must be filed in accordance with sec-
274. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-708(C) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
275. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-708(C) (Repl. Vol. 1993).
276. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-730(A) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
277. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-730(C) (Cur. Supp. 1996).
278. Id.
279. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-633, -832, -1067 (Cm. Supp. 1996); VA. CODE ANN. §
50-37.3 (Repl. Vol. 1996).
280. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-633 (Cum. Supp. 1996).
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tion 17-60.' The amendment establishes a uniform ten dollar
fee for recording such documents.282
D. Cancellation of Limited Partnership Certificate for Failure to
Pay Fee
The General Assembly amended sections 50-73.49 and -73.69
of the Virginia Code to provide for automatic dissolution of a
limited partnership upon the cancellation of the limited part-
nership certificate for failure to pay the annual registration
fee.' Prior to the amendment, section 50-73.69 only provided
for a penalty of twenty-five dollars for the failure to pay within
the time prescribed by the Virginia Code."' If the limited
partnership fails to pay its annual registration fee by October 1
in the year assessed, the State Corporation Commission will
mail a notice to the limited partnership of impending cancella-
tion of its certificate, and the certificate will automatically be
cancelled if the fee is unpaid as of December 31 of that
year.' Cancellation of the registration dissolves a domestic
limited partnership and the statute states that the dissolved
partnership shall be wound up."e
However, a limited partner is not liable as a general partner
by reason of the limited partnership's failure to pay the annual
registration fee or by reason of the cancellation of the limited
partnership certificate for failure to pay such fee. 7 The limit-
ed partnership may have its certificate reinstated by paying the
annual registration fee, all late fees, a reinstatement fee of one-
hundred dollars, and all other registration fees and penalties
within two years of the cancellation of the certificate.'
281. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-633 (Cum. Supp. 1996) (Virginia Code § 17-60 provides
that all documents involving title to real estate be recorded in deed books. VA. CODE
ANN. § 17-60 (Repl Vol. 1996)).
282. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-633 (Cum. Supp. 1996).
283. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-73.49, -73.69 (Repl. Vol. 1996).
284. See VA. CODE ANN. § 50-73.69 (RepL Vol. 1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 50-73.67
(Repl. Vol. 1994 & Cure. Supp. 1995).
285. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-73.69(B) (Repl. VoL 1996).
286. Id.
287. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-73.69(C) (Repl VoL 1996).
288. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-73.69(D) (Rept VoL 1996).
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If the name of the limited partnership is not available at the
time of reinstatement, the limited partnership must file an
amendment to its certificate of limited partnership changing its
name, or adopt an assumed name for use in Virginia as a pre-
requisite to reinstatement.89 If the limited partnership pays
the reinstatement fees and complies with the provisions of rein-
statement within two years after the date the certificate was
cancelled, the cancellation will be deemed to never have oc-
curred and partnership liabilities incurred between the cancella-
tion and reinstatement are treated as though the cancellation
had not occurred.Y°
E. Savings Banks Added to Definition of Financial Institution
The General Assembly amended sections 6.1-2.1, -2.9:4,
-194.87, -232, -250, -330.48, -381, 13.1-514, -620, and -627 of
the Virginia Code to replace references to "savings and loan
associations" with the phrase "savings institutions" in order to
clarify that savings banks are included within such referenc-
es.291 In particular, the General Assembly so amended the
provisions of the Virginia Stock Corporation Act which prohibit-
ed depository institutions from participating in partnerships,
joint ventures, or other associations which leave the depository
institutions open to unlimited liability.2 2 The amendment to
the Virginia Securities Act clarifies that securities issued by a
savings bank are exempt from securities regulation require-
ments 3
F. Numerous Changes to Limited Liability Company and
Partnership Acts
The Virginia General Assembly amended certain statutes
governing Virginia's limited liability companies and partner-
289. Id.
290. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-73.69(E) (Repl. Vol. 1996).
291. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 6.1-2.1, -2.9:4, -194.87, -232, -250, -330.48, -381 (Cum.
Supp. 1996); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-514, -620, -627 (Cum. Supp. 1996).
292. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-627(B) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
293. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-514(A)(4) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
1254
BUSINESS AND CORPORATE LAW
ships, making numerous technical changes."' The most signif-
icant change eliminates the requirement that a Virginia limited
liability company have a minimum of two members." A fur-
ther change to the Limited Liability Company Act provides that
the existence of a limited liability company can be delayed if
the articles of organization filed with the State Corporation
Commission state that the certificate of organization shall
become effective at a later time and date specified in the
articles. 6  Otherwise, the existence of a limited liability
company begins when the Commission issues a certificate of
organization. 97
A certificate with a delayed effective time becomes effective
at the earlier of the time or date so specified in the articles of
organization, or 11:59 p.m. on the fifteenth day after the date
on which the certificate is issued. 8 A delayed certificate will
not become effective if, prior to the effective time, the parties to
the articles file a request for cancellation and the Commission,
by order, cancels the certificate.'
The definition of "the parties," to which the statute refers, is
not clear. Articles of organization can be filed by a single orga-
nizer. The amended statute appears to require more than one
person to request a cancellation of the certificate.3" In addi-
tion, in the event that more than one organizer files articles
delaying the effective time of organization, the amended statute
appears to require a unanimous request by the organizers to
cancel the certificate.3"'
The statute governing management of a limited liability com-
pany originally provided that the managers shall be elected by
294. See VA. CODE ANN. § 11-3 (Cum. Supp. 1996); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-1002,
-1004, -1010.1, -1015, -1024, -1031, -1046, -1049, -1052, -1054, -1059, -1102, -1104,
-1105, -1110, -1117, -1121 (Cum Supp. 1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 50-73.11:1 (RepI. Vol.
1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-48 (Cum. Supp. 1996).
295. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-1002, -1046.3 (Cum. Supp. 1996).
296. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-1004(B), -1004(D)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
297. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1004(B) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
298. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1004(D)(1) (Cui. Supp. 1996).
299. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1004(D)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
300. See id.
301. See id.
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the members. 2 This statute has been amended to allow for
other means of electing managers to be set out in the articles
of organization or an operating agreement. 3
A change to the distribution statute eliminated the require-
ment that a member receive distributions from a limited liabili-
ty company before his or its resignation from the company!"
A change to the registered agent statute of the Limited Lia-
bility Company Act permits a professional registered limited
liability partnership to be a registered agent for domestic and
foreign limited liability companies."'
The statute governing a foreign limited liability company has
been amended to allow a foreign limited liability company to
add the initials "LC" or "LLC," to conform with name require-
ments of the Virginia Code.06 The section governing the name
of a professional limited liability company was similarly amend-
ed to allow the use of "PLLC" or "PLC."
30 7
Finally, the Virginia Code section prohibiting the solicitation
of the drafting of wills has been amended to allow a profession-
al limited liability company organized for the practice of law to
advertise the drafting of wills."0 8
G. Adoption of the Uniform Partnership Act of 1994
The Uniform Partnership Act of 1994 (the "Act") becomes
effective July 1, 1997."° The bill enacting the Act repeals sec-
tion 50-74 of the Virginia Code requiring the recordation of a
certificate of partnership effective July 1, 1997 and also repeals
other prior statutes governing partnerships as of January 1,
2000.310 While an in-depth discussion of the Act is beyond the
302. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1024(D) (Repl. Vol. 1993).
303. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1024(D) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
304. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1031 (Cum. Supp. 1996).
305. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1015(A)(2)(b) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
306. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1054 (Cum. Supp. 1996); see VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-
1012 (Cum. Supp. 1996).
307. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1054 (Cum. Supp. 1996).
308. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-48 (Cum. Supp. 1996).
309. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-73.79 to -73.149 (Repl. Vol. 1996).
310. H.B. 893, Va. Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1996); see VA. CODE ANN. §§ 50-1 to
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scope of this survey article, certain significant concepts deserve
mention.
Under the Act, partnerships may voluntarily file statements
of partnership authority."' Such statements can limit the ca-
pacity of a partner to act as agent for the partnership or trans-
fer property on behalf of the partnership. Statements of part-
nership merger and dissolution may also be filed with the State
Corporation Commission.
The Act also provides for the duties of loyalty and care which
a partner owes to the partnership and to the other part-
ners." Such duties include not doing business on behalf of
someone with an interest adverse to the partnership and re-
fraining from business in competition with the partnership.
The Act further provides that the withdrawal of a partner from
the partnership does not automatically result in the dissolution
of the partnership."4
-43.12 (Repl. Vol. 1996).
311. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-73.93 (Rep. Vol. 1996).
312. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-73.102 (Repl. Vol. 1996).
313. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 50-73.102(B)(2), (3) (Repl Vol. 1996).
314. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-73.111 (Repl. Vol. 1996).
1996] 1257

